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Introduction
Ample empirical evidence suggests that equity motives play a key role in many areas, such as international climate negotiations (Lange and Vogt, 2003; Kesternich et al., 2014; Vogt, 2016) , as well as taxation (Esarey et al., 2012; Höchtl et al., 2012; Kallbekken et al., 2010) . Another important field is the price setting of private goods (Kahneman et al., 1986) , for which there is evidence that people are more likely to be willing to pay for a good when its price is perceived as fair, which crucially depends on whether other customers pay the same price or whether there is price discrimination. In response to the bulk of empirical evidence, economists have developed theoretical models to account for fairness motives (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993) . Thus far, though, only few studies have analyzed the effect of fairness on the willingness-topay (WTP) for public goods.
This paper contributes to this line of inquiry by empirically investigating whether inequity affects households' WTP for green electricity based on randomized information treatments implemented in a stated-choice experiment among about 11,000 German households. Participants were randomly split into three experimental groups and asked for their WTP for increasing the share of green electricity in Germany, using the singlebinary-choice format.
One third of the sample households were explicitly informed about the existence of an exemption rule for the energy-intensive industry in bearing the burden of disseminating renewable energy technologies and were then asked about their WTP for green electricity. Another third of the sample households received the same information, but was requested to state their WTP if the exemption was to be abolished. The remaining third of households did not receive any further information before they were asked about their WTP.
Using this study design, we test two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that abolishing the exemption rule for the energy-intensive industry increases households' WTP for green 2 electricity (equity hypothesis). Second, providing information on the industry exemption should decrease households' WTP for green electricity (salience hypothesis).
Eliciting the WTP for goods is ideally based on revealed, rather than hypothetical choices, because the former involve a real economic consequence, such as signing a contract (Carson, 2012; Harrison, 2006) . Often, however, revealed preferences are not observable. Instead, stated-preference methods relying on hypothetical responses are frequently employed to estimate the WTP for public goods. A caveat of hypothetical elicitation formats is that they likely suffer from hypothetical bias, i.e. respondents may exaggerate their WTP or affirm a WTP question, although this decision does not necessarily reflect their true preferences (e. g. Gallet, 2001, Blumenschein et al., 2008 , and the reviews by Harrison, 2006 and Harrison and Rutström, 2008) .
Moreover, hypothetical choices might suffer from anchoring effects (Green et al., 1998) and protest bids (Jorgensen et al., 1999) . These findings stimulated research on contingent valuation methods and various techniques have been proposed to elicit the true WTP, for instance, ex-ante correctives, such as the cheap-talk protocol (Cummings and Taylor, 1999 ) and the consequential-script (Bulte et al., 2005) , and ex-post calibrations, such as the certainty approach (Johannesson et al., 1998) . More recent theoretical and empirical work demonstrates the importance of "consequentiality" for incentive compatibility, according to which the incentive to truthfully reveal preferences is predicated on the respondent deeming the stated WTP as consequential (Carson and Groves, 2007; Carson et al., 2014; Vossler et al., 2012; Vossler and Holladay, 2016) .
While there exists a bulk of research on the WTP for green electricity (e. g. Andor et al., 2017c; Ethier et al., 2000; Rose et al., 2002; Whitehead and Cherry, 2007) , empirical evidence on the impact of fairness aspects on the WTP for public goods is scarce. Notably, we are not aware of any empirical study that analyzes the impact of fairness on the WTP for green electricity, whereas there are a few empirical articles that evolve around the notion of fairness and responsibility. Bulte et al. (2005) , for instance, demonstrate that the WTP for an environmental public good is substantially higher if an environmental problem is caused by human action, rather than having natural causes. A few other studies analyze the relationship between WTP and distributional preferences. For example, based on a student population, Ajzen et al. (2000) find that perceived fairness of a requested contribution to a local public good affects individual WTP. Using alternative polluter-pay specifications and a random telephone sample of Washington State's electorate, Johnson (2006) finds that individual support for a proposed environmental regulation increases if polluters bear higher shares in total costs. Exploring the relationship between the WTP for climate change mitigation and distributional preferences, Cai et al. (2010) argue that the WTP increases when parties that are expected to take a greater responsibility for mitigation bear larger cost shares in mitigation and when respondents think that climate change disproportionately affects the world's poor.
We complement this strand of the literature by employing a single-binary-choice question on the WTP for green electricity, a format recommended by both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) panel on contingent valuation (Arrow et al., 1993 ) and the recent literature (e. g. Carson and Groves, 2007) . In addition, we correct for potential hypothetical bias by applying state-of-the-art approaches, such as an exante consequential script, and account for the political consequentiality of the survey as perceived by the respondents. Conducting a large-scale experiment among about 11,000 individuals, our analysis strongly contrasts with all those studies that are based on small samples, student populations, and telephone surveys with low participation rates. A further strength of our study is that it refers to a real, rather than a hypothetical policy measure: the promotion of green electricity, for which the exemption rule enjoyed by the energy-intensive industry implies a higher burden for other electricity consumers. This is all the more relevant as Germany's renewable promotion scheme causes substantial costs of around 25 billion Euros per year, equaling almost 1% of GDP.
Our central result is that abolishing the exemption for the energy-intensive indus-try raises households' WTP for green electricity. Most striking is the size of the effects: abolishing the exemption in contributing to this impure public good almost doubles the acceptance rate for a given burden. Our empirical finding that reducing inequity in the distribution of the cost burden increases the acceptance of bearing these costs may have far-reaching implications for policy-making in other fields where exemption rules exist as well, for instance in carbon tax schemes (Bjørner and Jensen, 2002; Martin et al., 2014; Rivers and Schaufele, 2015; Yamazaki, 2017) .
In the following section, we explain Germany's promotion system, followed by a concise description of our experimental setting and the database in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results. The last section summarizes and concludes.
Renewable Promotion in Germany
Producing green electricity on the basis of renewable energy technologies is a classic example of an impure public good, whose consumption simultaneously generates a private and a public utility (see e. g. Kotchen, 2006) : While consumers pay a price premium for being provided with green electricity, thereby enjoying a warm glow, greenhouse gas emissions that otherwise originate from fossil-based generation will be reduced by increasing green electricity production.
Yet, these advantages come at substantial costs: In many countries, green electricity is highly subsidized, with electricity consumers bearing the costs (IEA and IRENA, 2018) .
Energy-intensive companies, however, are frequently eligible for rebates to not endanger their international competitiveness. This holds for instance in Denmark, France, and the UK (CEER, 2017), as well as in Germany, where the share of green electricity in total consumption has been quintupled since 2000, to around one third today (BMWi, 2017) .
Energy-intensive facilities are, by law, eligible for rebates if the following pre-conditions are fulfilled: (1) a facility's electricity consumption level exceeds 1 million Kilowatthours (kWh), (2) its electricity cost intensity exceeds a sector-specific percentage, ranging between 14 and 20%, and (3) the facility implemented an energy management system. In 2016, about 2,800 facilities of around 2,100 companies were exempted from paying the full levy. These comprise about 4% of all companies of the industrial sector and accounted for about 40% of the industrial electricity consumption in Germany (BDEW, 2016) .
Germany promotes electricity generation based on renewable energy technologies via a feed-in-tariff (FIT) system whereby green electricity has preferential access to the grid and is remunerated at technology-specific, above-market rates that are commonly guar- 
Experimental Design
We conducted a stated-choice experiment in which we inquired about participants' hypothetical willingness to pay for further increases in the costs of the promotion of renewable technologies. In detail, participants were asked whether they are willing to ad- ditionally pay x ct/kWh for increasing the share of green electricity to 35% by 2020 (see Appendix A.1 for the exact questions). The amount x ∈ {1, 2, 4} was randomly assigned and framed as a rise in the EEG levy. Given that this levy has increased by more than 4 ct/kWh since 2009 (see Figure 1 ) and a multiple of today's renewable capacity has to be deployed in oder to reach Germany's renewable goals, the amounts of 1 to 4 ct/kWh reflect a plausible range of future cost increases.
Participants were randomly split into three experimental groups: First, one third of the participants, belonging to what is called here the Retain Group, were informed about the exemption of the energy-intensive industry and were subsequently asked whether they would accept a further rise of x ct/kWh in the EEG levy. Second, subjects who were randomly assigned to the group termed Abolish Group received the same information as those of the Retain Group, but were asked about their willingness to accept a given rise in the EEG levy if the exemption for energy-intensive companies was to be abolished. Finally, subjects of the so-called Uninformed Group did not receive any further information before they were asked about whether they would accept a given levy increase.
Based on this study design, we test two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that abolishing the exemption for energy-intensive firms increases households' WTP for green 7 electricity (equity hypothesis). Second, providing information on the industry exemption decreases households' WTP for green electricity (salience hypothesis). In principle, the equity hypothesis can be tested by comparing the share of households of the Abolish Group that are willing to accept the randomly given increase in the EEG levy with the respective share of the Retain Group. Likewise, the salience hypothesis can be tested by contrasting the respective shares of the Retain and Uninformed Group.
While hypothetical choices are frequently employed to analyze the WTP for renewable energy technologies (e. g. Andor et al., 2017b) , a potential shortcoming of this approach is that its stylized decision environment may induce participants to misreport their WTP, commonly referred to as hypothetical bias (e. g. Harrison, 2006 and Gallet, 2001 ).
To mitigate this bias, we opted for using a single-binary-choice format, as it is argued to be incentive-compatible for public goods with coercive payments (Carson and Groves, 2007) . 1 Furthermore, to increase the respondent's perception that their choice has real consequences, we a priori provided a consequential script, which emphasizes that the survey results will be made available to policy-makers and will be used for future decisions on the level of the EEG levy. Not least, we employ the so-called consequentiality approach, assuming that respondents reveal their true preferences only if they perceive their answers as consequential in terms of policy-making (Carson and Groves, 2007; Herriges et al., 2010; Vossler and Watson, 2013) .
Data
To elicit people's WTP for green electricity, we commissioned the survey institute forsa to carry out data collection. forsa maintains a household panel that is representative of the German-speaking population and employs a state-of-the-art tool that allows panelists to fill out the questionnaire using either a television or the internet -for more information, see http://www.forsa.com. Respondents -here the household heads -retrieve and return questionnaires from home and can interrupt and continue the survey at any time.
Household heads are defined as those individuals who are responsible for the financial decisions at the household level. While some socio-economic characteristics of our sample closely match the characteristics of the population of German household heads (see Table A1 in the Appendix), sample household heads tend to be younger and better educated, suggesting that the empirical results are not representative for Germany. Notably, about one third of the respondents holds a college degree, which is higher than the national average of 21.1%. Furthermore, with 38.2%, the share of women in our sample is rather low, above all due to our decision to request household heads to participate in the survey.
The survey took place between December 23, 2015, and February 19, 2016 , a period during which 11,375 individuals were recruited to fill out the questionnaire. 814 respondents abandoned the survey prior to the experiment, which corresponds to a dropout rate of 7.2%. This rate is in line with other studies that are based on this household panel, see e. g. Andor et al. (2017a) . The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 indicate that randomization was successful and that selection bias is not an issue: with a few exceptions, socio-economic characteristics are very similar across experimental groups, as is reflected by t-test statistics for the mean differences in the covariates that are statistically not significantly different from zero.
One exception is the indicator for pro-environmental attitudes, proxied here by the statement to be in favor of voting for Germany's Green Party, for which the share of 11.3% Note: t-test statistics for mean differences between the control group and the treatment groups are in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and the 1% level, respectively.
is somewhat higher in the Uniformed Group than in the other experimental groups. Overall, the share of respondents who tend to vote for the Green Party amounts to about 10%, which is in line with the results of the most recent federal election of 2017. It also bears highlighting that about three quarters of the respondents perceive the survey as consequential, that is, they believe that the survey results may have political consequences.
This large share hardly varies across experimental groups. For comparison purposes, Table A2 presented in Appendix A.3, displays the summary statistics for those respondents who believe in political consequences of the survey.
Empirical Results
The focus of our empirical analysis is a binary indicator that equals unity if a respondent is willing to accept a hypothetical increase of either 1, 2, or 4 ct/kWh in the levy raised for the promotion of green electricity and zero otherwise. The descriptive results, presented in Table 2 , reveal that the acceptance rates decrease substantially with the size of the levy increase, indicating internal validity of the responses. For example, across experimental groups, the share of respondents who accept an extra 4 ct/kWh is between about 13 and 18 percentage points lower than for an increase of 1 ct/kWh. Note: z-test statistics for the equality in proportions with respect to the control group are in parentheses. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
As hypothesized, the acceptance rates differ substantially across experimental groups.
For instance, the share of respondents in the Abolish Group who accept a randomly given increase in the EEG levy is about 35-40 percentage points higher than in the Retain Group, indicating that abolishing the exemption for energy-intensive firms raises the WTP for green electricity dramatically relative to the situation in which the exemption is retained.
This outcome supports the equity hypothesis, according to which fairness considerations play an important role with respect to the WTP for green electricity. The randomized experimental design allows us to test this hypothesis on the basis of proportion tests (see Appendix A.2). Actually, the z-test statistics presented in Table 2 indicate that the differences in the average acceptance rates between the Abolish and the Retain Group are statistically significant throughout.
Furthermore, as the salience hypothesis suggests, when respondents are explicitly informed about the existence of the industry exemption, as is done for those of the Retain Group, the acceptance rates are some 20 percentage points lower compared to that of the Uninformed Group. Most striking is the size of the effects: abolishing the exemption in contributing to this impure public good more than doubles the acceptance rates for given increases of 2 and 4 ct/kWh, a larger effect than when quartering this burden.
To check the robustness of our results, we follow Carson and Groves (2007) Table A3 in Appendix A.3, as for the entire sample (Table 2 ). Most notably, the propensity of accepting higher EEG levies is higher among respondents who perceive the survey as consequential than for the entire sample. Yet, the differences in mean acceptance rates across experimental groups are similar in magnitude.
In addition to the robustness check based on consequentiality, we now estimate three linear probability models to confirm the results reported in Table 2 . In Specification Focusing first on the coefficient estimates resulting from Specification (1) (left-hand panel of Table 3 ), we again find strong treatment effects that exactly mimic the differences in mean acceptances across experimental groups (Table 2) . For instance, with 0.354, the estimate of the coefficient on the Abolish Group indicator yields a treatment effect of abolishing the industry exemption relative to the Retain Group that is identical to the difference of 35.4 percentage points between the average acceptance rates of both groups for an EEG levy increase of 1 ct/kWh. Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the 1 % and 5 %level, respectively.
Estimating Specification (2), where socio-economic characteristics are included as regressors, hardly varies the magnitude of the treatment effects (right-hand panel of Table   3 ). This outcome is to be expected if randomization into the experimental groups is suc-13 cessful. The coefficient estimates for the socio-economic characteristics are all unsurprising and indicate that women, college graduates, and participants with green attitudes are more likely to accept an increase in the EEG levy than the reference person, who inter alia is male and in the Retain Group. Moreover, the propensity to be willing to pay more for green electricity increases with age and income, while it is lower for households residing in East Germany and for homeowners. It also bears noting that these results turn out to be robust when we focus only on those respondents who believe that the survey results may have political consequences. The estimates reported in Table A4 in Appendix A.3 reconfirm the very large treatment effects, particularly with respect to the difference between the Abolish and the Retain Group, which amounts to some 37 percentage points.
Investigating the heterogeneity of the treatment effects with respect to socio-economic characteristics in our third model specification, in which the experimental group dummies are interacted with all socio-economic characteristics, we find that both female respondents and respondents who are inclined to vote the green party have particularly strong preferences for fairness. In fact, Figure 2 illustrates that the difference between the acceptance rates in the Abolish and the Retain Group is particularly pronounced for voters of the green party.
Finally, while we tacitly assume in our analysis that respondents perceive the exemption rule for the energy-intensive industry as unfair, we admit that we have no empirical information on this issue. Yet, as an indication for the perceived unfairness of the industry exemption, we exploit information that we obtained in the aftermath of the experiment by asking participants whether they agree or disagree with the justification of the industry exemption. On average, only 17% of the respondents think that the industry exemption is justified (Table 1) , which points to the notion that the exemption is widely perceived as unfair. It bears noting, however, that the randomized assignment to an experimental group across which the provision of information on the exemption is varied, has a bearing on the responses: Figure 3 illustrates that the percentage of respondents agreeing with formation on the exemption in the experiment than for those who did not obtain this information. These differences across experimental groups are statistically significantly different from zero, as can be seen from the test statistics reported in Table 1 . From Figure   3 , we also learn that with about 15% the share of respondents who think that the industry exemption is justified is lower for the Uninformed Group than for the other groups.
Summary and Conclusion
The perceived fairness of a price is widely recognized to be a critical determinant for people's WTP for a good (Ajzen et al., 2000; Kahneman et al., 1986) . In this paper, we have explored how equity motives, particularly the inequality in the coercive payments for green electricity, affect the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for this impure public good.
Based on randomized information treatments implemented in a stated-choice experiment among nearly 11,000 German households, we find that, on the one hand, abolishing the exemption for the energy-intensive industry substantially raises households' WTP for green electricity. On the other hand, when households learn about the prevalence of un- A caveat of our stated-preference approach is the potential emergence of hypothetical bias. To mitigate this bias, we have employed a consequential script as ex-ante corrective and the consequentiality approach, assuming that respondents reveal their true preferences if they perceive their answers as consequential in terms of policy-making (Carson and Groves, 2007; Herriges et al., 2010; Vossler and Watson, 2013) . On the basis of the latter approach, we conclude that our key results of large treatment effects is robust. While we are optimistic to have reduced hypothetical bias by pursuing these approaches, we argue that even if there was any hypothetical bias, it seems unlikely that hypothetical bias renders our conclusions invalid given the large treatment effects.
The empirical outcome that the distribution of the cost burden highly matters for the acceptance of bearing these costs may be a general principle that may have strong implications for policy-making in other fields, such as carbon taxation. For instance, Rivers and Schaufele (2015) suggest that the introduction of a carbon tax in British Columbia was only publicly accepted because the government reduced the tax rate for low-income 16 households and companies. Apparently, as the acceptance of policies crucially hinges on the distribution of the associated costs, conceiving appropriate payment rules is key for the public acceptance of any policy instrument, not least greenhouse gas abatement measures.
A Appendix

A.1 Translation of the Description of the Experiment
Introduction to the Experiment "We will now ask about how much you are willing to pay for electricity that is generated with different energy sources and technologies. In what follows, we will call it your 'willingness-topay'."
Information on the Promotion of Green Electricity
"Germany's promotion of green electricity has contributed to the deployment of 93 Gigawatt (GW) of renewable energy technologies by 2014 and a share of 28% of green electricity in production.
The German government aims at increasing the share of green electricity to 35% by 2020. In Germany, the promotion of green electricity is financed via the so-called EEG levy. This levy has to be paid by every household for each unit of electricity consumed (kWh) and amounts to 6.17 ct/kWh in 2015. Since the average electricity price in 2015 is 28.8 ct/kWh, this corresponds to a share of some 21%.
Choice Situation
Uninformed Group: "Are you willing to pay an increase in the EEG levy by x ct/kWh (to then y ct/kWh) in order to achieve the goal of increasing the share of green electricity to 35% by 2020?"
Retain Group: "About 4% of industrial companies, which cover about 40% of the industrial electricity consumption, do not have to pay the full amount of the EEG levy. This exemption is intended to shield companies, so as not to undermine their international competitiveness. If the exemption for the energy-intensive is retained, are you willing to pay an increase in the EEG levy by x ct/kWh (to then y ct/kWh) in order to achieve the goal of increasing the share of green electricity to 35% by 2020?"
Abolish Group: "About 4% of industrial companies, which cover about 40% of the industrial electricity consumption, do not have to pay the full amount of the EEG levy. This exemption is 18 intended to shield companies, so as not to undermine their international competitiveness. If the exemption was to be abolished, are you willing to pay an increase in the EEG levy by x ct/kWh (to then y ct/kWh) in order to achieve the goal of increasing the share of green electricity to 35% by 2020?" 
Consequentiality
Opinion about the Exemption
"Currently energy-intensive companies do not have to pay the full amount of the EEG levy. What is your opinion about this rule?" The possible answers to this question are "I think they are appropriate" and "I think they are inappropriate".
A.2 Methods
To test whether our binary dependent variable Y i , which equals unity if respondent i is willing to accept a hypothetical increase of either 1, 2, or 4 ct/kWh in the EEG levy, differs across experimental groups (see Table 2 ), we perform tests on the equality of proportions π 1 and π 2 .
The test is based on the null hypothesis H 0 : π 1 = π 2 and the normally distributed test statistic
, whereπ 1 andπ 2 are the sample proportions of Group 1 and 2, respectively, and n 1 and n 2 denote the respective group sizes (Ott and Longnecker, 2010) .
In principle, to estimate treatment effects, it suffices to simply take the differences in Y across experimental groups: Given perfect randomization, the difference between two group averages in Y is then a consistent estimator for the corresponding average treatment effect. Alternatively, treatment effects can be estimated by a linear probability model (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ), such as Specification (1): 2
where As a robustness check, we add socio-economic characteristics, captured by vector x, to Specification (1):
Finally, to investigate heterogeneity across experimental groups with respect to socio-economic characteristics, we add interaction terms of the treatment groups with these characteristics to Specification (2) and estimate this third specification. Data for the population of German household heads is drawn from Destatis (2017) . This data source asks the main earner to complete the questionnaire, whereas we ask the household member who usually makes financial decisions at the household level. Furthermore, the variable high income is top-coded at 4,500 EUR, while in our sample the upper threshold is at 4,700 EUR. Note: t-test statistics for mean differences between the control group and the treatment groups are in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **,* denote statistical significance at the 1 % and 5 %level, respectively.
A.3 Tables
